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I. INTRODUCTION

What is the liability of a five-star hotel for the theft of a car parked in its
premises through valet parking? This question was answered by the Supreme
Court of India in its recent decision in Taj Mahal Hotel v United India
Insurance Co. Ltd.1 The Court held that the hotel was liable for the loss of the
car. In order to arrive at this conclusion, the Court was required to look into
certain legal i+ssues pertaining to consumer protection law and contract law
which had never arisen for its consideration in the past.
In this case note, I discuss:(a) the relevant facts of the case; (b) the Court’s
findings on the legal issues; (c) I argue that while the Court analyzed the issues
in a lucid manner, it overlooked the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act
1986 (‘1986 Act’) and rendered its findings purely from a contract law perspective. Although this flaw did not affect the outcome in the facts before the
Court, it has curtailed the rights of a consumer under the 1986 Act.

*

1
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Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies and University of Geneva.
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

An individual (the ‘Consumer’) went to Taj Mahal Hotel (hereinafter the
‘Hotel’) in his Maruti Zen car. The Consumer handed over the car keys to the
Hotel valet for parking and went inside the Hotel. He was provided a parking
tag by the valet who stipulated that the car was being parked at the guest’s
own risk and responsibility and the Hotel would not be responsible for any
loss, theft or damage to the car (hereinafter ‘Exclusion of Liability Clause’).
When the Consumer came out of the hotel, he was informed that his car had
been stolen by three boys who had come to the Hotel and one of them picked
up the keys of the Consumer’s car from the Hotel desk. The Consumer had
insured the car and subrogated its rights in respect of the theft of the car to the
Insurer after his insurance claim was settled by the Insurer.
The Insurer and the Consumer filed a complaint before the State
Commission against the Hotel under the 1986 Act, seeking payment of
the value of the car and compensation for deficiency in service. The State
Commission and National Commissioner held in favor of the Insurer and the
Consumer. The Hotel filed an appeal before the Supreme Court challenging the
decision of the National Commission.
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING

The Hotel raised a preliminary objection with respect to the maintainability of the Complaint on the ground that the Insurer did not qualify as a
‘consumer’ and therefore, it had no right to file a complaint under the 1986
Act. The Supreme Court rejected this submission, relying on its decision in
Economic Transport Organisation v Charan Spg. Mills (P) Ltd.,2 where it had
held that a complaint filed by an insurer acting as a subrogee is maintainable
inter alia if it is filed by the insurer and the assured as co-complainants. In Taj
Mahal Hotel, the Insurer and the Consumer were co-complainants. Therefore,
the Court held that the pre-condition for filing a complaint by the Insurer as
laid down in Economic Transport Organisation had been met and the Insurer
had the locus standi to file the complaint.
On the substantive issue of liability of the Hotel for the stolen car, the Court
examined it from a contract law perspective. This was the first time that the
Supreme Court had been called upon to adjudicate upon this issue. The Court
engaged in a detailed comparative analysis of the liability of ‘innkeepers’3 in
2
3

(2010) 4 SCC 114.
As the Court notes, hotels owners were traditionally called ‘innkeepers’ (See ¶ 12).
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various jurisdictions and noted that while the liability of a hotel owners or an
innkeeper was strict in nature under common law, it has now been restricted in
most common law jurisdictions to fault-based liability.
According to the fault-based liability approach (referred to by the Court as
the ‘prima facie liability rule’), ‘the hotel owner is presumed to be liable for
loss or damage to the vehicle of the guest upon his failure to return the same.
However, he has an opportunity to exonerate himself by proving that the loss
did not arise due to negligence or fault on his part or that of his servants’. The
Court held that under Indian law as well, the prima facie liability rule must
be applied as it balances the interests of hotel owners and guests and does not
place undue burden on either party.
Crucially, however, the Court held that the prima facie liability rule was
premised on the existence of a relationship of bailment between the hotel
owner and the guest, and therefore, a contract of bailment must be found to
subsist for the hotel owner to be liable. Such a contract would come into existence only if the custody or possession of the vehicle is ‘purposefully handed
over’ to the hotel by the guest. On facts, the Court found that the relationship
between the Consumer and the Hotel in Taj Mahal Hotel was one of bailor-baileeas per Section 148 of the Contract Act 1872.
Therefore, the standard of care required to be taken by the Hotel in respect
of the Consumer’s car is that prescribed in Section 151 of the Contract Act.
Since the car had been stolen from the Hotel’s premises, it was prima facie
established that the Hotel had failed to take due care as required under Section
151 and the burden of proof lay on the Hotel to disprove this fact. The Court
found that the Hotel had failed to discharge this burden and therefore, it was
held to be negligent in its conduct.
Finally, the Court was required to determine the effect of the Exclusion
of Liability Clause on the Hotel’s liability for its negligence. This issue, too,
had come for consideration before the Supreme Court for the first time. The
Court affirmed the more-than-a-century old minority opinion (on this issue)
of Sankaran Nair, J. in Mahamad Ravuther v British India Steam Navigation
Co. Ltd.4 and held that the Hotel could not contract out of its obligation under
Section 151 of the Contract Act.5 Thus, the Exclusion of Liability Clause did
not absolve the Hotel of its liability for the loss of the car. Thus, the Court
ruled in favor of the Insurer and the Consumer.
4
5

(1908) 18 Mad LJ 497, MANU/TN/0073/1908.
This issue merits a separate analysis altogether which is outside the scope of this case
comment.
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IV. THE OVERLOOKING OF THE
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 1986

The Supreme Court’s analysis of the legal issues in Taj Mahal Hotel pertaining to the obligations of the Hotel is extremely detailed and coherent.
However, it is not a flawless one, for it is centered on the Contract Act (in particular, the subsistence of a contract of bailment) and in this process, ignores
the provisions of the 1986 Act. This is discussed below:

A. The Failure to Take Note of the Requirement of ‘Deficiency’ in
Service
The complaint filed by the Insurer and the Consumer alleged deficiency in
the service provided by the Hotel. According to Section 2(1)(c) of the 1986 Act,
deficiency in service [defined in Section 2(1)(g)] is one of the six categories of
allegations that can be made in a complaint filed under the Act. This assumes
significance because for a consumer complaint to be successful, it is necessary
that at least one of the six categories of allegations enlisted in Section 2(1)(c) is
proved by the complainant.6
In the present case, since the only allegation under Section 2(1)(c) was deficiency in service, it was necessary for the Court in Taj Mahal Hotel to have
concluded that this allegation was proved before it could grant any relief to the
Insurer and the Consumer. In fact, the Supreme Court in Ravneet Singh Bagga
v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,7 has categorically held that,
‘[i]n the absence of deficiency in service the aggrieved person may
have a remedy under the common law to file a suit for damages but
cannot insist for grant of relief under the Act for the alleged acts of
commission and omission attributable to the respondent which otherwise do not amount to deficiency in service’ (emphasis provided).
In other words, in a complaint filed before a consumer forum under the
1986 Act, the cause of action is distinct in nature (ie deficiency in service)
from what may be urged before a civil court.
The Court’s omission in Taj Mahal Hotel to take into account the provisions
of the 1986 Act could perhaps be viewed as inconsequential to the outcome
of the case, as the breach of the Hotel’s obligation arising out of the contract
of bailment would constitute ‘deficiency in service’, which would have entitled the Court to grant the same reliefs to the Insurer and the Consumer that
6
7

Bhubaneshwar Development Authority v Susanta Kumar Mishra, (2009) 4 SCC 684.
(2000) 1 SCC 66.
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it eventually did. However, the law laid down by the Supreme Court will have
a bearing on cases where a contract of bailment is found to be non-existent, as
the Court predicated the Hotel’s obligation to take due care of the car on the
subsistence of a contract of bailment.
According to the Court, where the guest merely parks her car in a parking
space or facility, the relationship between the parking authorities and the guest
is one of licensor-licensee and not bailor-bailee; consequently, the parking
authorities would not have any liability in such a case. This binary approach holding the parking authority liable where a contract of bailment subsists and
absolving it from liability where no such contract is found to exist - is contrary
to the provisions of the 1986 Act.
To elaborate, it is necessary to look into the meaning of ‘deficiency’ as
defined in Section 2(1)(g) of the 1986 Act, which reads as follows:
“‘deficiency’ means any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inade
quacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance which is
required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being
in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in
pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service”
(emphasis provided).
‘Deficiency’ is defined to mean any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or
inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance of an act in the
prescribed manner. The prescription to carry out the act in a given manner
may stem from: (a) any law; (b) a contract; (c)any source other than law or
contract. The words ‘or otherwise’ in Section 2(1)(g) have been interpreted by
the Supreme Court in Punjab Urban Planning and Development Authority v
Vidya Chetal,8 to subsume ‘other modes of standard setting alternative instruments other than contracts such as laws, bye-laws, rules and customary practices, etc’. Therefore, it is settled that a deficiency in service is not premised
solely on the existence of a contractual obligation.
One of the sources of an obligation to take due care of cars parked in one’s
premises is the doctrine of legitimate expectation. While this doctrine has its
origins in administrative law; the Supreme Court has consciously extended
its applicability to disputes under the 1986 Act. In Malay Kumar Ganguly v
Sukumar Mukherjee,9 the Court held that the position and stature of the doctors
treating the patient and the hospital where the treatment was being carried out
8
9

(2019) 9 SCC 83.
(2009) 9 SCC 221.
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raised a legitimate expectation as to the standard of care in medical service
from the doctors and the hospital. Indeed, in Taj Mahal Hotel itself, the Court
held that the responsibility of five-star hotels to take measures to ensure the
safety of cars parked in their premises is ‘higher’. There is no contractual provision or statutory law which required the Court to impose a higher duty of
care on five-star hotels vis-à-vis other hotels. It is simply the legitimate expectation of the consumer that given the premium price paid for services at a fivestar hotel, the nature of services provided by such hotels would be superior.
Therefore, in a given scenario, the car owner may have a legitimate expectation that that the parking authorities would take due care of the car parked in
their premises even if there is no contract of bailment. For instance, let us take
a situation where a car owner parks the car herself in a shopping mall and does
not hand over the keys of the car to the person in-charge of the parking area in
the mall. The car owner pays Rs. 50 as parking fees and is issued a receipt for
the same. All cars exit the parking area from a common exit only after showing the receipt issued to the driver.
In such a situation, there is no contract of bailment as the possession of
the car has not been handed over by the car owner to the mall authorities.
However, the car owner would be justified in assuming that the mall authorities would take due care of the car inside the parking area and prevent it from
being stolen. This is a legitimate expectation of the car owner. Any loss or
damage to the car would ordinarily constitute a deficiency in service on the
part of the mall and would entitle the car owner to claim compensation under
the 1986 Act. However, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Taj Mahal Hotel,
which focuses on the issue solely from a contract law perspective and ignores
the provisions of the 1986 Act, would have the effect of absolving the mall
authorities from liability.
The fallacy in the Court’s approach in Taj Mahal Hotel is also evidenced by
its reasons for distinguishing the National Commission’s decisions in Corpn. of
Madras v S. Alagaraj,10 and Rohini Group of Theatres v V. Gopalakrishnan.11
In Alagaraj, a complaint was filed under the 1986 Act against the Corporation
of Madras for loss of the complainant’s two-wheeler which was parked in the
parking area designated by the Corporation. The National Commission held
that the Corporation had provided the parking facility for a nominal fee of Re.
1/- and objective of the Corporation was to regulate traffic.

10
11

1995 SCC Online NCDRC 1.
1996 SCC Online NCDRC 1.
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In such circumstances, the Corporation could not be assumed to have
undertaken any liability for the loss of vehicles parked in the parking area. In
Rohini Group of Theatres, the National Commission followed its decision in
Alagaraj in the context of loss of a bicycle of the complainant who had gone
to a theatre and parked his bicycle in the theatre premises for a fee. Neither of
these decisions absolved the parking authority of liability on the ground that no
contract of bailment was found to exist. Nonetheless, according to the Court in
Taj Mahal Hotel, both Alagaraj and Rohini Group of Theatres were inapplicable to the facts of Taj Mahal Hotel because there was no contract of bailment
in either of those two cases, as opposed to Taj Mahal Hotel.
The Court relied on decisions of the English Court of Appeal12 and the
Delhi High Court13 to buttress its conclusion that in the absence of a contract of bailment, there exists merely a licensor-licensee relationship between
the car owner and the parking authority, and therefore the parking authority
has no obligation to the car owner in relation to the car parked in the former’s
premises.
However, both these decisions were rendered in the context of a claim instituted in a civil court for compensation for loss of the car. Neither of these
decisions involved a determination of whether there was a ‘deficiency’ in the
service rendered by the parking authority, which, as discussed above, constitutes a broader substantive obligation than the obligation arising out of a licensor-licensee relationship.

B. The Case of Gratuitous Bailment
One of the contentions raised by the Hotel in Taj Mahal Hotel was that the
Consumer did not pay any charges for valet parking and therefore, the Hotel
was not obligated to ensure the safety of the car. The Court rejected this contention on the ground that the Contract Act does not distinguish between the
obligations of a bail or in case of a gratuitous bailment and a bailment for
reward. The Court held that ‘it is irrelevant as to how much parking fee was
paid by the consumer, or whether any parking fee was paid at all, as the duty
of care required to be taken by the hotel will be the same in all circumstances’
(emphasis provided).
This reasoning and conclusion would be entirely correct if the Consumer
had filed a civil suit seeking compensation for the loss of the car. However,
it is erroneous in the context of a dispute arising under the 1986 Act.It is
12
13

Ashby v Tolhurst, (1937) 2 KB 242.
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v DDA, 1991 SCC OnLine Del 8, AIR 1991 Del 298.
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well-established that a complaint under the 1986 Act can only be filed by a
‘consumer’ as defined in Section 2(1)(d). A ‘consumer’ is a person who buys
goods or avails of any service for a consideration. Moreover, the definition
of ‘service’ in Section 2(1)(o) of the Act also excludes any service rendered
free of charge and the Supreme Court has time and again recognized this
exception.14
A reading of Sections 2(1)(d) and 2(1)(o) would make it unequivocally clear
that in the absence of any consideration, an individual cannot be considered as
availing of any ‘service’ and cannot qualify as a ‘consumer’. Such an individual has no locus standi to file a complaint under the 1986 Act. For this reason,
the Court’s conclusion that it is irrelevant as to whether any parking fee was
paid at all is erroneous and fails to take into account the provisions of the 1986
Act.
V. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court’s decision in Taj Mahal Hotel constitutes an important
milestone in consumer protection law (as well as contract law), as it lays down
important propositions of law. It is now settled that the liability of a hotel in its
capacity as a bailor of its guests’ belongings is not strict in nature, but the burden of proof lies on the hotel to establish that any loss or damage caused to the
guests’ goods was not on account of its negligence.
However, Court’s analysis has failed to take into account the provisions of
the Consumer Protection Act 1986. The Court has especially failed to note
the requirement to prove deficiency in service in order to grant reliefs in proceedings under the 1986 Act and the meaning of ‘deficiency’ in service. This
has resulted in the Court sourcing the obligation to take due care of vehicles
parked in one’s premises solely and exclusively on a contract of bailment even
though the 1986 Act envisages other sources of such an obligation.
Prior to the decision in Taj Mahal Hotel, the existence of a legitimate
expectation and the consequent obligation to ensure the safety of vehicles
parked in one’s premises would be determined on a case-to-case basis and the
subsistence of a contract of bailment would merely be one of the elements to
determine whether such an obligation exists. However, in light of the law laid
down in Taj Mahal Hotel, it is only in situations where a contract of bailment
is found to be in existence that the Persons in-charge of parking facilities can
be held liable for loss or damage to vehicles parked in their premises.
14

LDA v M.K. Gupta, (1994) 1 SCC 243; Indian Medical Assn. v V.P. Shantha, (1995) 6 SCC
651; Punjab Urban Planning and Development Authority v Vidya Chetal, (2019) 9 SCC 83.

